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The BAROMETER is a student newspaper for the exchange of ideas and 
information concerning the development and improvement of the 
professional environment at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
+*+*+*+*+*+*+*+* 
"The War College is presently adapting to the changing trends in 
foreign relations, domestic sociology and economics, and military 
technology and balance of forces. If we fail to acknowledge the 
impact of these trends on our profession, we may miss one of the 
great historical opportunities for the exercise of maritime power. 
Whether our particular curriculum will help us to get there or not, 
it is too early to predict. I believe that we are moving in the 
right direction. The worst of the trials of change is behind us. 
Successive classes should savor even greater opportunities." 
Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN, President, Naval War College 
EDITORIAL COMMENT: Among the many changes which have caused controversy in the Navy in the 
past few years was the recent series of modifications to the curriculum at the Naval War 
College in Newport, R.I. This issue of the BAROMETER will include comments by Vice Admiral 
Turner in his Annual Report (1973) and descriptions of what the new course is composed of. 
FEATURE: NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 1972-1973, THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 
WHY AN ANNUAL REPORT? o l> :::: -n 
"An Annual Report is a means used by most educational institutions- to ~ise alumni and 
friends of the experience of the past year and of future plans. It s~~ fitting this year 
that the Naval War College should issue an Annual Report. The colle~~haS'been · reqrganized, 
our educational philosophy rethought, and our objectives changed. It~ b~n a year of 
experimentation, of trial and error, and now we would like to see whe~e~ve been, the 
achievements, the shortcomings, the lessons learned, and where we ar~ going. ;:~ 
GENESIS OF CHANGE 
In the past 90 years the Naval War College has varied its emphasis from the far-ranging 
concepts of maritime power enunciated by Mahan to tactical doctrine and techniques, to the 
strategy and tactics of oceanwide naval campaigns, to the position of the United States as 
the leading power in the international political and military affairs of the post-World War 
II Clra. In 1972 it appeared to me to be particularly appropriate to review the curriculum to 
ensure that it fitted with the changing world and military environment. 
Over the past decade three developments appear to have changed the demands which the Navy 
and its officers face. The first is in the area of U.S. foreign policy and national strateg~ 
Here both form and substance are undergoing fundamental alterations. In this process, the 
military element is less persuasive than in the past, particularly in the public forum. Our 
advice is accepted less on the basis of past prestige and precedent. In the emerging aura of 
detente, the standard rationales for military preparedness are challenged as outmoded and 
shallow. To be effective today, military strategists required a broad perspective on 
national strategy. They need, for instance, the breadth to see that the bipolar world we 
knew and taught for a quarter of a century was really a historical happenstance. It appeared 
that it was time to hearken back to Mahan's days at Newport, when he and the students 
studied the historical heritage of the Navy and probed the strategic purposes of having naval 
forces. 
Secondly, we have clearly entered a period in which the ordering of national priorities 
is forcing very difficult choices between military and nonmilitary expenditures. How this 
will balance out in the years ahead will depend on many national and international factors. 
Still, stiff competition for resources must be anticipated. This will require realistic 
appraisals of the alternative employments of available funds. The amount of funds the Navy 
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receives will be increasingly a function of how our chosen alternatives compare with those 
of others. This requires officers who can see what another man's alternatives might be, 
as well as our own, and analyze objectively the strengths and weaknesses of both. In 
short, it appeared that new emphasis on the economics of defense decisionmaking was in order. 
Thirdly, we have left behind the days when the U.S. Navy had clear qualitative and 
quantitative advantage at sea. No longer can we implicitly count on overwhelming all 
potential opponents. We must be ready to be more clever and more innovative in our tactics. 
This, after all, should be our long suit. We have the stronger heritage of experience and 
success at sea. As long as we do not mistakenly become shackled to traditional tactical 
patterns, this should be a strong asset. This situation appeared to call for a return to 
the War College's concentration on naval tactics, as in the 1920's and 1930's, the period of 
which Admiral Nimitz spoke when he said that the battles of World War II had been war gamed 
in advance here. In addition, the pace of technology provides today's commander with many 
more options than his predecessor. We may not be able to anticipate the preferred tactic 
from amongst those available. but we should be able to identify tactical decision points and 
the type of choices which will have to be made. Teaching approved tactics, or doctrine, 
is the province of the training establishment; our concern appeared to be the reasoning ~ 
process for deriving tactics in light of whatever weapons and sensors may appear on 
tomorrow's horizon. 
If a Naval War College is to serve the Navy and the Nation well, it must improve the 
officer students' abilities to address in depth these three particular areas. In addition, 
one very important factor which must also be taken into account in considering what to 
teach is the experience and attitude of the students. Many officers today have a rather 
rigid and restrictive view of the decisionmaking process. Most midcareer officers come 
from a "Newtonian world"-a world with rational right and wrong answers to fairly clearly 
defined questions. Much of their experience is with technical systems that demand exact 
treatment and with the military command environment, which properly calls of unambiguous 
response. What we need, then, is to construct a course that involves the students with 
varying kinds of decisionmaking problems, best with uncertainty and imprecision, the type 
they will certainly face in the future. In other words, the task at hand was to design a 
course that would help them to deal more confidently with decisions involving uncertainty. 
After considering many alternative approaches, we chose the study of real world cases of 
decisionmaking in the three areas of concern. In Strategy this meant scrutizing the decision~ 
of past strategists and recognizing the rational and nonrational, the precise and imprecise 
factors that past decisionmakers weighed in balance. In the area of defense economics, it 
meant looking at cases involving management decisions which highlighted objectives, alter-
native solutions and their comparisons, and more importantly, the principles which they 
imply. In Tactics it meant identifying key tactical interactions and estimating the impact 
of different courses of action at each potential decision juncture. Overall, this led us 
to a curriculum that stresses problem solving in each of these three areas, rather than 
factual data of a contemporary nature. This means teaching how to approach a few represent-
ative problems, with the idea that this would prepare the students to handle a variety of 
problems in their future assignments. 
PRINCIPAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN ACADEMIC YEAR 1972-73 
We structured the curriculum to a problem-solving approach, treating the areas of 
strategy, resource management, and naval tactics. A year has gone by. A graduating class 
is now performing in many diverse billets. I believe that, as a whole, these officers are 
better able to approach problems and cope constructively with today's world because of their 
War College education. Of course, the proof of my belief is as yet conjecture in large 
measure, but here are some of the evidences which influenced my judgment: 
STUDENT INVOLVEMENT. In the broadest sense, the primary objectives of the new currir- lum 
is to sharpen the critical faculties of the students. Accomplishment of this objective was 
evidenced by many students as time progressed by the improved quality of their seminar 
discussions and by the type of questions they posed in their seminars and to lecturers. By 
midyear, for example, a visiting Navy Project Manager was confronted by student questions 
that revealed feasible alternatives which he previously had not considered. Another measure 
of the heightened critical faculties of the students came from the comments of our visiting 
lecturers and panelists who had occasion to observe the students. O~e visiting professor. 
wrote: 1 got the. -<mpll.e.6.6.<..on-inde.e.d, .6btong -<mpfte.611'<"on-that the. c.uJVUc.ui..um had lluc.c.e.e.de.d -<.n 
enga.g.<..ng .6tude.n:tA. The.y Welte. aLe. .<..nvo.f..ve.d and, e.ve.n'<"6 the.y d.<..dn' t fte.ai.<..ze. a, "e.ngage.d". 
The.y Welte. th.<..nlUng about the. e.nUtr.e. e.nd e.av Oft, and a WlL6 c.e.tr.tMn.t!:[ c..e.e.M that the. pIl.og':'V" 
un6 hav.<..ng an -<mpac.t upon them-60ft 1 . e.nc.ountelte.d no on~ wh~ WlL6 ll-<!"p.ty n~ Oft pMll-<.Ve.. 
And a .6e.em6 to me. that when a te.ac.h.<..ng pIl.ogMm hall t/UA lUnd 06 ..unpac.t--<.6 il pftoduc.e.6 
fte.6POnlle.6 and fte.ac.t.<..on-then a .<..ll, .<..n 6ac.t, a .6uc.c.e.6116ui.. pftogMm. 
INDIVIDUAL EFFORT: The best way for a college to sharpen individual critical faculties 
is to exercise the reasoning powers of the students t o their fullest. We moved in this 
direction by reducing the number of required lectures on the ground that lectures are a 
passive learning experience. In their stead, reading requirements quintupled, and writing 
demands increased markedly. Additionally, examinations were instituted. 
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Examinations, aturally, were controversial. Overall, they proved beneficial. At the 
end of the year, the majority of the students endorsed them as a positive learning experience 
The principal real hazard of exams was the obvious effort of some students to "win"-to seek 
the school solution-rather than to learn. This could well have been expected since these 
officers are highly competitive and since many of them believe that there are right and 
wrong answers to even complex problems and, hence, to examinations. We tried, but not 
fully successfully, to destroy this illusion by preparing ~xamination questions that encoura-
ged more than one answer. Our intent was to ask questions the demanded sound reasoning and 
not the parroting back of memorized factual data. Many different answers could receive a 
grade of "superior". Even at the year's end some of the students could not accept this and 
continued to want "right" solutions. The persistence of that tendency is a measure of the 
degree to which we fell short of our expectations. 
CURRICULUM FOCUS. Perhaps the most significant change in the curriculum was the 
deemphasizing of contemporary data and events. This was based on the belief that we should 
be looking to the long term, the 5 to 15 years that these officers have left to serve the 
Navy, rather than their next tour of duty. At first this was difficult for many of the 
~ .udents to accept, for, naturally, they are competitively oriented to today and tomorrow. 
There was also some concern that specific areas of Navy specialty were not being highlighted 
independently. By covering specialty areas through case studies, we expect to show the 
student such matters as international law, communications, public affairs, et cetera, in 
the total context of the Navy rather than in a series of separate and discrete fragments. 
SCHOLASTIC DISCIPLINE. The course applied the lessons of history to the issues of 
today in order to deepen the students' grasp of the motivating forces in international 
relations and strategic competition. They, for instance, probed the multiple meanings of 
the basic terminology, e.g., "limited war", "balance of power", et cetera. Many students 
did not appreciate that they were making a connection between historical examples and current 
practice until well into the course or until they were immersed in subsequent courses and 
looked back. Perhaps the most unique element of the new program was plunging these officers 
into a scholastic discipline. The starkness of this change forced them to stretch 
critical faculties •••. 
FUTURE PLANS AND PROBLEMS 
The changes we have made certainly did not bring unmixed blessings. It will be a number 
of years before we can confidently assess their impact. In the interim, certain decisions 
must be addressed in light of the information which we currently have. 
FORMAL DEGREES. Our long and rewarding association with George Washington University was 
terminated amicably this year. Increased student involvement in our own curriculum, brought 
about by the decrease in outside lecturers and increase in reading and writing assignments, 
reduced significantly the time available to pursue profitably a cooperative degree program. 
This was demonstrated by the number of students who attempted both but, because of the heavy 
demands of the resident program, dropped the George Washington program. Also, the surfeit 
of officers holding an advanced degree in international affairs reduced the utility of the 
program to the Navy. Many students were disappointed by this action both because the degree 
was tangible evidence of academic achievement and because many believed it affected 
promotion and assignment opportunities. This has raised again the question of possible 
accreditation at the master's level of our own program. Although many educators agree that 
the War College program is the full equivalent of a master's program in a civilian university, 
accreditation would, among other things, limit flexibility in faculty appointments, force 
the inclusion of unwanted courses in the curriculum, limit authority for course revision, 
require an act of Congress, and be of little real value to the Military Establishment. 
However, accreditation is being examined-both full and partial. 
PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES. To attract talent students and faculty, it is imperative that 
th~War College maintain a reputation for excellence. With the termination of the master's 
program, some prospective students may question whether diligent application to a formal 
curriculum is worthwhile. It is all very well to say they will be enriched professionally, 
but will anyone except themselves know it? 
We have moved to make the rewards for excellence commensurate with the individual student's 
efforts. Those students who achieve recognition . as Distinguished Graduates receive 
substantive fitness reports, many of these are recommended for accelerated promotion, and 
the appropriate selection boards are being briefed on this change in procedure. Fitness 
reports for all students contain the statement, " ..• The Chief of Naval Personnel has 
recognized completion of this curriculum as the professional military counterpart of an 
academic master's degree and is so considered for officer personnel management purposes." 
In addition, at the completion of each segment of the curriculum, we identify those 
students who have excelled in that area. I then write a personal letter to the appropriate 
service Chief of Personnel pointing out that these officers/civilians are particularly well 
qualified for duty in strategic planning/politico-military affairs or program planning/ 
systems analysis/program management or tactical evaluation and development. Hopefully, these 
letters will help to place our best performers in top billets in which they are interested 
and where they will be provided the opportunity to develop the potential they displayed at 
the War r.nJlepp- . - . 
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COURSE CONTENT. The pressures to introduce specific material at the expense of material 
designed to develop critical reasoning faculties are unceasing. Almost every day someone 
comes by with a new idea of what has been left out of the curriculum. Most of these ideas 
relate to items that are high on lists of contemporary concerns. We do not have the time, 
however, both to treat in depth issues of current interest and to conduct courses aimed at 
enhancing defense problem solving and decisionmaking. 
The coming year will be devoted to consolidation of gains and minor course adjustments 
dictated primarily by excellent student course evaluations, faculty reactions, recommendat-
ions of an independent consultant on curriculum evaluation from a prominent university, and 
a better understanding of how to achieve our expressed goals. Primary emphasis will be on 
improved technique with minor changes in course content. 
The Strategy and Policy Course will emphasize more strategy and less history, though 
historical case studies will still be the teaching vehicle. This year's case studies will 
place greater emphasis on the maritime element of strategy. The course will also incorporate 
three new seminar topics covering the post-World War II period, but hopefully without 
getting mired down in the details and emotionalism of current affairs. ~ 
The Management Course has been renamed "Defense Economics and Decisionmaking" to reflect 
more precisely its content. The sequence of course material will be restructured. Quantit-
ative analysis will be taught in the standard college classroom style rather than in 
seminars. We also plan to incorporate more material on human motivation and the behavioral 
sciences. A formal course in this area has been designed, and case studies emphasizing 
the human aspects of decisionmaking and implementation will be introduced in the seminars. 
In the Tactics Course the readings on the fundamentals of weapons and sensors will be 
revised. There will also be increasing emphasis on the analytical steps for deriving 
tactical procedures •••• NEW CURRICULUM 
The three basic courses will be interwoven between the College of Naval Warfare (CNW) 
(Senior Course), the College of Naval Command and Staff (CNC&S) (Junior Course), and the 
Naval Command College (NCC) (International Officer Course) as follows: 
1st Trimester 2d Trimester 3d Trimester 
(14 weeks) (14 weeks) (10 weeks) 
CNW Strategy and Policy Defense Decisionmaking Naval Tactics 
NCC Strategy and Policy Defense Decisionmaking Naval Tactics 
CNC&S Defense Decisionmaking Naval Tactics Strategy and Policy 
This program minimizes faculty requirements by dividing the student load roughly into two 
equal groups which will be taught by separate faculties each trimester. It also means that 
each faculty teaches two trimesters out of three and has one trimester for research, teaching 
electives, and study. 
Under this year's program CNW and CNC&S students will take identifical Defense Decision-
making Courses. CNW is offered 4 more weeks of Strategy and Policy than CNC&S while the 
reverse will hold true for Naval Tactics. 
THE RELEVANCE OF WAR COLLEGES. The question occasionally arises as to whether these 
changes we have madeat Newport are implicitly a criticism of the programs at the other four 
War Colleges. My response to this is emphatically "No". Each War College has a distinct 
mission. Each has distinct problems and priorities. For instance, one of the primary 
considerations in altering the curriculum at the Naval War College has been the difficulty 
in freeing naval officers from the top 10-15 percent of the officer corps to attend. Another 
problem has been the fact noted above that only about 15 percent of the Naval Warfare 
College students are graduates of a Command and Staff College. Neither of these conditiohS 
pertain at the other War Colleges. The changes we have made have been uniquely tailored to 
the conditions here. If some of the changes at Newport would be useful to the other 
colleges, we are anxious to share them and are doing so. 
At the same time, our changes here strengthen our position vis-a-vis external critics of 
War Colleges in general. Higher military education is indeed under scrutiny today. We have 
strengthened our position by eliminating expensive field trips, by deleting the competing 
master's degree program, by increasing the academic workload, and by constructing a course 
that cann~t be found elsewhere in civilian or military institutions. Military strategy is 
not taught on civilian campuses. In the lingering wake of Vietnam, military history is also 
out of vogue on them. Our Defense Economics and Decisionmaking Course is uniquely tailored 
to DOD and Navy resource management issues, which are not the focus of civilian business 
schools. Our Tactics Course is unique to the Navy in every respect. We stand ready to defend 
the need for this college on these grounds of professional education for our profession alone, 
but it also has a more far-ranging justification. 
This is the need for a center of thinking on maritime matters. If we are indeed a 
profession and if the Navy has a long-term importance to our country, somewhere, someplace, 
some people must escape the standard stereotypes and think deeply about the purposes, trends, 
and future of that Navy. It is difficult to do this in the atmosphere of daily pressures in 
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Washington. Newport is the ideal in many respects by being close yet distant from the 
day-to-day realities of running the Navy. We need, then, to develop a true university 
atmosphere here in Newport, one in which, in addition to the teaching that is accomplished, 
there is a place for research, lectures, symposia, and visiting scholars and military 
commanders, all to the end of promoting a certain intellectual vigor and stimulus." 
(Excerpts from the NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, ANNUAL REPORT 1973.) 
***SERVICE NOTES 
ASSAULT SHIP CHRISTENED - USS TARAWA (LHA-l), designed from keel up with the requirements 
of the landing force in mind, was launched 1 December 1973 at Pascagoula, Miss. It is the 
first of five new general purpose amphibious assault ships, which in the words of Gen. 
Robert E. Cushman, Jr. "gets it all together". The Commandant was principal speaker at 
the launching ceremony. Mrs. Cushman was the ship's sponsor. The LHA will carry a 
battalion landing team (BLT) , its equipment and supplies, and land them either by helicopter 
of tracked landing vehicles (LVT). The ship stands 20 stories high. TARAWA, which is 
scheduled for delivery in 15 months, and its following sister ships, will become the back-
bone of the Navy/Marine Corps amphibious team. MARINE CORPS GAZETTE January 1974. 
NEW SES BID REQUESTS SEEN - Navy is expected this week to issue a new request for proposals 
or an amended version of the original request for the detailed design phase of developing 
a 2,000-ton surface effect ship (SES) and development of component technology. But the 
service is proceeding in a manner to minimize claims by contractors against the government. 
Preliminary source selection named two contractors, Textron Bell Aerospace Div. and 
Lockheed, from among four competitors after Aerojet-General failed to submit a cost proposal 
package as required by the earlier proposals request. Bell and Aerojet both have operational 
prototype 100-ton SES vessels undergoing rough water tests. 
The fourth competitor is Rohr!Litton, and Navy and Defense Department officials intended 
to keep them in the development for solving some component problems while the two prime 
contractors, Bell and Lockheed, begain detailed development. 
Aerojet-General told Navy and Defense Department officials that component technology 
development was necessary and that 18-24 months additional time would be required for that 
purpose. 
A Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) decision to provide a period for 
component development while design continues caused the Pentagon and the Navy to resume 
2,OOO-ton SES development with a re-bid approach because the delay is similar to that cited 
by Aerojet-General when it elected not to submit a cost proposal in answer to the original 
RFP. 
Some Pentagon officials are calling the latest action by the Defense Department "the 
Aerojet decision" because the DSARC action could reopen the competition to that company. 
Dr. Malcolm R. Currie, director of Defense research and engineering is insisting 
that, since the delay in component development is necessary and since it is close to 
Aerojet's position, the contractor must be allowed to compete. 
Some Pentagon and Navy officials believe Aerojet has done everything possible to slow 
down the 2,OOO-ton SES program because the company lacked sufficient technology to compete. 
Some company and other Defense Department officials believe the DSARC action has vindicated 
the contractor's position. 
The Aerojet-General SES-lOOA prototype has experienced six failures over the past year 
and a half, and company officials lay the cause to the salt water demisters used on the four 
Lycoming TF35-l6 engines. Aerojet now believes most engine problems have been solved. 
Bell uses three Pratt & Whitney FT12A-6 engines at 4,500 shp. and also has experienced 
fax1ures since beginning saltwater testing in the Gulf of Mexico. (AVIATION WEEK & SPACE 
TECHNOLOGY February 4, 1974.) 
